terça-feira, 10 de fevereiro de 2015

(h) THE DISCOVERY OF WINE ACCORDING TO MILLÔR FERNANDES

Appendix of the draft-book Philosophical Semantics


Appendix to Chapter 6


THE DISCOVERY OF WINE


Eine Art zu philosophieren steht nicht neben anderen wie eine Art zu Tanzen neben anderen Tanzarten. Die Tanzarten schliessen nicht gegenseitig aus oder ein. Aber man kann nicht ernsthaft auf eine Art philosophieren, ohne die anderen verworfen oder aber einbezogen zu haben. In der Philosophie geht es demgegenüber wie in jeder Wissenschaft um Wahrheit.
[A way of doing philosophy is not related to others as a form of dance with other forms. Forms of dance are not mutually exclusive or inclusive. But no one can philosophize in one way without having rejected or incorporated others. In philosophy, on the other hand, as in every science, the concern is with truth.]
Ernst Tugendhat

There is a mythical story of the discovery of wine, told by the humourist Millôr Fernandes in his book Fabulous Fables (Fernandes 1963). It goes as follows:
   A traveller needed to cross a desert. Since he loved grapes, though not the pits and skin, he had the idea of bringing with him in his saddlebag, instead of water only the juice of pressed grapes. After a journey of three days, he saw that the juice had turned yellow, tasted different and was releasing bubbles. After he had drunk this beverage, he noted that it made him feel much better than usual, so much so that he judged this to be the most enjoyable trip of his entire life! After his arrival, he told the news to his fellow travelers, who decided to follow his example, making long journeys across the desert with heavy saddlebags filled with the juice of pressed grapes, so that they could enjoy the same feeling of well-being. For a long time this state of affairs continued unchanged, until one day a stubborn camel refused to commence a journey and remained glued to the same spot with the grape juice on his back for three days. To the surprise of the camel’s owner, the juice also changed its colour and taste and produced bubles. The news spread quickly. From the discovery of fermentation to the bottling and commercialisation of wine, it was hereafter a very short step.
   For me this story illustrates the too easy ways in which we can go astray in the development of our philosophical conjectures. In a world plaged by a growing multiplication of philosophical views, many of them unavoidably pointless, this difficulty can give place to a dangerous disorientation that mundles in unappealing forms of scapism like scepticism, relativism and irrationalism. Under these circumstances the attempt to achieve a comprehensive picture, as it was done here, brings results that may impose themselves by the force of their internal coherence.
   Of course, the mentioned difficulties have in one way or the other always belonged to philosophy, since the matter has always rised great hopes that time has shown to be even in the best cases highly illusory. Concerning this, my hope regarding the stories told in this book is still the same: to have arrived at a right comprehensive view of the matter, in the case the cluster of conceptual structures associated with our epistemic meaning, uncovering the adequate path towards a critical consensual truth – something that approaches science and spares the reader the many senseless long journeys in the deserts of philosophically delusory arguments.








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[1] Retold from Millôr Fernandes: ‘A descoberta do vinho’, in his book Fabulas fabulosas (Rio de Janeiro: J. Álvaro editora, 1963).


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