terça-feira, 25 de julho de 2017


Draft for the last appendix & bibliography - book Philosophical Semantics

Appendix to chapter VI


We have first raised a dust and then complain we cannot see.
George Berkeley

Once one absurdity is accepted, the rest follows.

There is a mythical story of the discovery of wine, told by the humourist Millôr Fernandes in his book Fabulous Fables (1963), which I would like to recall here. It goes as follows:
   A traveller once needed to cross a desert. Since he loved grapes, though not grape pits and skin, it occurred to him that he could bring with him in his saddlebag instead of water only the juice of pressed grapes. After a journey of three days he noticed that the juice had turned yellow, tasted different and was releasing bubbles. After he had drunk this beverage, he noted that it made him feel much better than usual, so much so that he judged this to be the most enjoyable trip of his entire life! After his arrival, he told the news to his fellow travellers, who decided to follow his example, making long journeys across the desert with heavy saddlebags filled with the juice of pressed grapes, so that they could enjoy the same feeling of well-being. For a long time this state of affairs continued unchanged, until one day a stubborn camel refused to commence a journey and for three days remained so to speak nailed to the same spot with the grape juice on his back. To the surprise of the camel’s owner, the juice also changed its colour and taste and released bubbles. The news spread quickly. From the discovery of fermentation to the bottling and commercialization of wine, it was hereafter a very short step.
   For me this story illustrates the too easy ways in which we can go astray in developing our philosophical conjectures. In a world plagued by a growing multiplication of philosophical views, many of them locked up in equivocal foundations, this difficulty can lead to dangerous disorientations that pile up in unappealing forms of escapism like scepticism, relativism, irrationalism and sophistry, not to speak about expansionist scientism. Under these circumstances, the effort to achieve a comprehensive picture as was done here, could give some guidance, suggesting conclusions that may impose themselves by the force of the picture’s internal coherence.
   My point should not be carried out too far: the above mentioned pitfalls have in one way or the other always belonged to philosophy, since the matter has always raised hopes that time has shown to be even in the best cases highly illusory. Concerning this, my hope regarding the stories told in this book is still the same: I expect to have arrived at the right comprehensive view of the cluster of conceptual structures associated with reference and cognitive meaning, finding in this way an adequate path to critical consensual truth – something that approaches science in its wider sense[7] and spares the reader many long, senseless journeys across deserts of philosophically illusory arguments.


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