I am publishing here only a summary. The whole book will be published by in the collection of analytic philosophy of De Gruyter in 2023-24, and cannot be published here.
SUMMARY
For
fifty years the philosophy of language has been experiencing a stalemating
conflict between the old descriptive and internalist orthodoxy (advocated by
philosophers such as Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Strawson, and Searle) and
the new causal-referential and externalist orthodoxy (mainly endorsed by
Kripke, Putnam, and Kaplan). Although the latter is dominant among specialists,
the former retains a discomforting intuitive plausibility. The ultimate goal of
this book is to overcome the stalemate by means of a non-naïve return to the
old descriptivist-internalist orthodoxy. Concerning proper names, this means
introducing second-order description-rules capable of systemizing descriptions
of the proper name’s cluster to provide us with the right changeable conditions
of satisfaction for its application. Such rules can explain how a proper name
can become a rigid designator while remaining descriptive, disarming Kripke's
and Donnellan’s main objections. In the last chapter, this new perspective is
extended to indexicals in a discussion of David Kaplan’s and John Perry’s views,
and to general terms, in a discussion of Hilary Putnam’s externalism.
Nenhum comentário:
Postar um comentário