sábado, 12 de agosto de 2017

Claudio Costa: PHILOSOPHICAL TEXTS - TEXTOS FILOSÓFICOS


THIS "BLOG" IS THOUGHT AS A WAY TO MAKE MY WORK IN PHILOSOPHY ACCESSIBLE TO A WIDE PUBLICUM. THERE ARE MORE THAN 100 TEXTS, MOST OF THEM IN DRAFT FORM. MANY ARE INTRODUCTORY TEXTS. THE TEXTS MARKED WITH ONE OR MORE # ARE THOSE THAT CAN BE OF SOME INTEREST FOR THE SPECIALISTS. I HOPE IT IS USEFUL.

ESSE "BLOG" FOI PENSADO COMO UMA MANEIRA DE TORNAR MEU TRABALHO EM FILOSOFIA ACESSÍVEL A UM PÚBLICO MAIS AMPLO. SÃO MAIS DE 100 TEXTOS, A MAIORIA EM FORMA DE DRAFT. AQUELES MARCADOS COM UM OU MAIS # SÃO OS QUE PODEM SER DE ALGUM INTERESSE PARA A PESQUISA. OS TRABALHOS MAIS ANTIGOS E INTRODUTÓRIOS ESTÃO EM PORTUGUÊS E PODEM SER ENCONTRADOS NAS ÚLTIMAS PÁGINAS. PODEM SER DIDATICAMENTE ÚTEIS.

On my CV:
After a graduation in medicine I made my M.S. in philosophy at the UFRJ (Rio de Janeiro), Ph.D. at the University of Konstanz (Germany) and post-doctoral works at the Hochschule für Philosophie (Munich) and at the universities of Berkeley, Oxford, Konstanz, Göteborg, and at the École Normale Supérieure. 
My main articles published in international journals were collected and better developed in the book Lines of Thought: Rethinking Philosophical Assumptions (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014). Also from interest may be a short theory on the nature of philosophy in the book The Philosophical Inquiry (UPA, 2002). Presently I am writting a book aiming to recuperate the credibility of the old orthodoxy in analytic philosophy of language. This book, to be called Philosophical Semantics, will be also published by CSP in 2017. 

I am full professor at the Department of Philosophy of the UFRN, Natal, Brazil, though with ergonomic limitation due to a light degree of autism.

Advertisement of some published books (see Amazon.usa):




















A PREFACE

For the book Philosophical Semantics, to be published by CSP in 2017/2 (draft version)






PREFACE


Indem die Besinnung auf das Destruktive des Fortschritts seinen Feinden überlassen bleibt, verliert das blindlings pragmatisierte Denken seinen aufhebenden Charakter, und darum auch die Beziehung auf Wahrheit.
[In that reflection on the destructive aspect of progress is left to its enemies, blindly pragmaticized thought loses its uplifting character and thereby also its relation to truth.]
Theodor Adorno & Max Horkheimer

Making empty is the result of making small.
Malcolm Bull

Science (mainly applied science) rises, while culture (artistic, religious, philosophical) falls. Whereas culture was once a source of values, today science and technology have made cultural values seem superfluous.
   The critical theory of society has offered some explanations for this. Drawing on Max Weber’s basic concept of the ‘disenchantment of the world’ (Entzauberung der Welt), it asserts that in our modern technological society instrumental reason prevails over valuing reason, promoting mass culture and furthering science and technology at the expense of the old mystical-humanistic culture, without having sufficient resources to fill the void left behind.
   Under the pressure of this scientistic institutional framework, we should not wonder that a kind of philosophy prevails that all too often materially and institutionally mimics the ways particular scientific fields work. It often mimics sciences in a way that suggests the way much of continental philosophy has mimicked literary forms, that is, often counterfeiting the most proper forms of philosophical argumentation with the effect of losing its relation to truth. For instance, by taking into account only the discussions of recent years, one might work as if philosophy is going through the same linear development as science, only to find itself somewhere later in a previsible cul-de-sac. But this inevitably segmented philosophy of the ‘last novelty’ made for ‘immediate consumption’ by and for specialists and related scientists no longer seems, as in the tradition, to be an independent conjectural undertaking making balanced use of whatever new scientific knowledge can serve its purposes. More often, it seems a busy handmaiden of science suffering from loss of identity and self-esteem: particularized proto-scientific speculation, atomized conjectural work that does not look beyond its own narrow interests and scarcely touching the central philosophical problems legated by the tradition.
   In pointing to this, I am far from embracing Manichaeism. I am not claiming that for science to exert great influence on philosophy is inevitably specious and unfruitful. Often philosophy plays a role in furthering the development of particular sciences. Moreover, there are felicitous cases, like the rapid proliferation of theories of consciousness over the last four decades, which serves as a striking example of fruitful philosophical work directly associated with the development of empirical science that has deepened the field of investigation – and this is only one example among many.
   Nevertheless, it is important to remember that this same intellectual movement can easily become an ideologically motivated agenda if it tempts the theoretical philosopher to import new knowledge from particular sciences – formal or empirical – in ways that cause him to lose sight of the vast scope of the philosophical landscape. A possible consequence of this may be what some have aptly labeled expansionist scientism: an effort to forcefully reduce some domain of philosophy to the scope of investigative strategies and views derived from a more or less established particular science. In order to achieve this aim, the particular (formal or empirical) scientific field must be expanded in order to answer questions belonging to some central domain of philosophy, using a reductionist strategy that under­estimates philosophy’s encompassing and multifaceted character (a first example of expansionist scientism was in my view Pythagoreanism, which tried to find answers to the problems of life in numbers and their applications). The price one must pay for this may be that persistent, distinctive philosophical difficulties that cannot be accommodated within the new particularizing model must be minimized, if not quietly swept under the rug.
   A chief inconsistency of scientism arises from the fact that while sciences are in various ways all particular, philosophy is most properly ‘holistic’: As Wittgenstein once wrote, the funda­mental problems of philosophy are so interconnected that it is impossible to solve any one philosophical problem without first having solved all the others. Insofar as his claim has any truth, it means that a persistent difficulty of the central philosophical problems is that we need a proper grasp of the whole to be able to evaluate and answer them properly. This is what can make philosophy so unbearably complex and multifarious. And the lack of this is what can make philosophy appears like a headless turkey running around. Taking account of parts as belonging to a whole, trying to see things sub specie totius, is also what the great systems of classical philosophy – such as those of Aristotle, Kant and Hegel – strove to achieve, even if paying a price that we are now better able to see as unavoidably high in terms of misleading and aporetic speculation. Nonetheless, it would be too easy to conclude that true comprehensiveness is no longer a fundamental desideratum of philosophy (Wittgenstein was well aware of this when he called for more ‘Übersichtlichkeit’).
   A main reason for the narrowness and fragmentation of much of our present linguistic-analytical philosophy can be explained as follows. The new Anglo-American philosophy – from W. V-O. Quine to Donald Davidson, and from Saul Kripke to Hilary Putnam and Timothy Williamson – has challenged a great variety of inherited commonsensical starting points and challenged them in often undeniably insightful and imaginative ways, although in my view with ultimately unsustainable results. Because of this, a large part of theoretical philosophy has increasingly lost touch with its intuitive commonsensical grounding in the way things prima facie seem to be and for the most part really are.
   Take, for instance, the concept of meaning: the word ‘meaning’ was challenged by Quine as too vague a noise to be reasonably investigated. But an approach is inevitably limited if it starts from a kind of positivist reductionist perspective that denies or ignores commonsense certainties, like the obvious fact that meanings exist. Indeed, using this strategy of skeptically questioning all kinds of deeply ingrained truisms, scientistically oriented philosophers have sawed off the branches they were sitting on. The reason for this is that the result of the adopted strategy couldn’t be other than replacing true comprehensiveness with a superficializing positivistic fragmentation of often misleadingly-grounded philosophical concerns, which ends by plunging philosophy into what Scott Soames called the ‘age of specialization.’
   This fragmentation can be regarded as dividing to conquer, I admit; but it may also be a matter of dividing to subjugate; and what is here to be subjugated is often the philosophical intellect. Indeed, by focusing too much on the trees, we may lose sight of the philosophical forest and thereby even of where the trees are. Without the well-reasoned assumption of some deep common­sensical truisms, no proper descriptive metaphysics (P. F. Strawson) remains possible. And without this, the only path left for originality in philosophy of language, after rigorous training in techniques of argumentation, may turn out to be the use of new formalistic pyrotechnics of unknown value. This would have the end-effect of blocking the paths of inquiry, disarming adequate philosophical analysis and increasing the risk that the whole enterprise will degenerate into a sort of scholastic, fragmented, vacuous intellectual Glasperlenspiel.
  It may be that practitioners of reductive scientistic philosophy are aware of the problem, but they have found plausible excuses for neglecting to solve it. Some have suggested that any attempt to do philosophy on a comprehensive level would not suffice to meet the present standards of scholarly adequacy demanded by the academic community. But in saying this they forget that philosophy does not need to be pursued close on the heels of new advances in the sciences, which are continually producing and handing down new authoritative developments. Philosophy in itself still remains an autonomous cultural enterprise: it is inherently conjectural and dependent on indispensable metaphorical elements intrinsic to its pursuit of comprehensiveness. Most of philosophy remains a relatively free cultural enterprise with a right to controlled speculation, experimentation and even transgression, though most properly done in the pursuit of truth.
  Others have concluded that today it is impossible to develop a truly encompassing theoretical philosophy. For them this kind of philosophy cannot succeed because of the difficulties imposed by the overwhelming amount of information required, putting the task far beyond the cognitive capacity of individual human minds. We are – to borrow Colin McGinn’s original metaphor – cognitively closed to finding decisive solutions for the great traditional problems of philosophy: In our efforts to do ambitious comprehensive philosophy, we are like chimps trying to develop the theory of relativity: Just as they lack sufficient mental capacity to solve the problem of relativity, we lack sufficient mental capacity to develop comprehensive philosophy and will therefore never succeed! Hence, if we wish to make progress, we should shift our efforts to easier tasks...
  This last answer is perhaps specious and borders on defeatism. The very ability to initiate the discussion of broadly-inclusive philosophy suggests that we might also be able to accomplish our task. As Wittgenstein once wrote, if we are able to pose a (true) question, it is because we are also in principle able to find its answer. In contrast to human thinkers, one indication that chimps could never develop a theory of relativity is that they are unable to even pose questions such as what would happen if they could move at the speed of light. The intelligence needed to pose such questions is about the same as the intelligence needed to answer them. Even if the total amount of scientific knowledge available to us has increased immensely, it may well be that the amount of really essential information needed to answer any given question is sufficiently limited for us to grasp and apply. As Russell once theorized, very often the science needed to do philosophy can be limited to very general findings. Moreover, not all philosophical approaches need to be taken into account, since they are often superimposed or displaced. The main difficulty may reside in the circumstances, strategies and authenticity of attempts, in limits on the context of discovery, rather than in the sheer impossibility of progress. In any case, it is a fact that in recent years, true comprehen­siveness has almost disappeared in the philosophy of linguistic analysis. However, the main reason does not seem to be impossibility in principle, but rather loss of the proper cultural soil in which a more comprehensive philosophy could flourish.
  In this book, I begin by arguing that more fruitful soil can be found if we start with a better reasoned and more affirmative appreciation of commonsense truisms, combined with a more pluralistic approach, always prepared to incorporate the relevant (formal and empirical) results of science. Perhaps it is precisely against the unwanted return of a broader pluralistic approach that much of the mainstream of our present philosophy of language secretly struggle. This is often obscured by some sort of dense, nearly scholastic scientistic atmosphere, so thick that practitioners barely notice it surrounding them. The intellectual climate sometimes recalls the Middle Ages, when no one was allowed to challenge established religious dogmas. I even entertain the suspicion that in some quarters the attempt to advance any plausible comprehensive philosophy of language against the institutional power of reductive scientism runs the risk of being ideologically discouraged as a project and silenced as a fact.
  Ernst Tugendhat, who (together with Jürgen Habermas) attempted with considerable success to develop comprehensive philosophy in the seventies, has recently seemed to be hoisting the white flag and conceding that the heyday of philosophy is past. The problem is in my view aggravated because we live in a time of widespread cultural indifference, heavily influenced by the steady almost exponential development of science and technology that minimizes the role of valuing reason. Though quite indispensable from the viewpoint of the instrumental reason, our scientific age tends to impose a compart­mental­ized form of alienation on philosophical research that works against more broadly oriented attempts to understand reality.

  In the present book, I insist on swimming against the current. My main task here – a risky one – is to establish grounds for a more comprehensive philosophy of meaning and reference, while arguing against certain reductionist-scientistic approaches that are blocking the available paths of inquiry. Hence, it is an attempt to restore its deserved integrity to the philosophy of language, without offending either common sense or science; an effort to give a balanced, systematic and sufficiently plausible overview of meaning and the mechanisms of reference, using bridges laboriously constructed between certain summits of philosophical thought. In this way, I hope to realize the old philosophical ambition of a comprehensive synthesis, insofar as this still sounds like a reasonable undertaking.  



terça-feira, 25 de julho de 2017

APPENDIX CHAPTER VI and BIBLIOGRAPHY

Draft for the last appendix & bibliography - book Philosophical Semantics


Appendix to chapter VI



THE DISCOVERY OF WINE


We have first raised a dust and then complain we cannot see.
George Berkeley

Once one absurdity is accepted, the rest follows.
Aristotle

There is a mythical story of the discovery of wine, told by the humourist Millôr Fernandes in his book Fabulous Fables (1963), which I would like to recall here. It goes as follows:
   A traveller once needed to cross a desert. Since he loved grapes, though not grape pits and skin, it occurred to him that he could bring with him in his saddlebag instead of water only the juice of pressed grapes. After a journey of three days he noticed that the juice had turned yellow, tasted different and was releasing bubbles. After he had drunk this beverage, he noted that it made him feel much better than usual, so much so that he judged this to be the most enjoyable trip of his entire life! After his arrival, he told the news to his fellow travellers, who decided to follow his example, making long journeys across the desert with heavy saddlebags filled with the juice of pressed grapes, so that they could enjoy the same feeling of well-being. For a long time this state of affairs continued unchanged, until one day a stubborn camel refused to commence a journey and for three days remained so to speak nailed to the same spot with the grape juice on his back. To the surprise of the camel’s owner, the juice also changed its colour and taste and released bubbles. The news spread quickly. From the discovery of fermentation to the bottling and commercialization of wine, it was hereafter a very short step.
   For me this story illustrates the too easy ways in which we can go astray in developing our philosophical conjectures. In a world plagued by a growing multiplication of philosophical views, many of them locked up in equivocal foundations, this difficulty can lead to dangerous disorientations that pile up in unappealing forms of escapism like scepticism, relativism, irrationalism and sophistry, not to speak about expansionist scientism. Under these circumstances, the effort to achieve a comprehensive picture as was done here, could give some guidance, suggesting conclusions that may impose themselves by the force of the picture’s internal coherence.
   My point should not be carried out too far: the above mentioned pitfalls have in one way or the other always belonged to philosophy, since the matter has always raised hopes that time has shown to be even in the best cases highly illusory. Concerning this, my hope regarding the stories told in this book is still the same: I expect to have arrived at the right comprehensive view of the cluster of conceptual structures associated with reference and cognitive meaning, finding in this way an adequate path to critical consensual truth – something that approaches science in its wider sense[7] and spares the reader many long, senseless journeys across deserts of philosophically illusory arguments.
















REFERENCES


Abbagnano, N. (2013). Dizionario di FilosofiaTorino: UTET.
Adorno, T. and M. Horkheimer (2010). Die Dialetik der Aufklärung. Frankfurt: Fischer Verlag.
Alexander, H. G. ed. (1956). The Leibniz-Clark Correspondence: With Extracts from Newton’s Principia and Optics. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Alston, P. W. (2001). ‘A Realist Conception of Truth,’ in M. P. Lynch (ed.), The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives. Cambridge, MA: MIT-Press.
Aristotle (1984a). ‘Categories.’ In The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 1. (ed.) J. Barnes. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- (1984b). Metaphysics. In The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 2 (ed.) J. Barnes. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Armstrong, D. M. (2010). Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- (2004). Truth and Truth-Makers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- (1999). The Mind-Body Problem: An Opinionated Introduction.  Boulder: Westview Press.
- (1997). A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- (1981). ‘What is Consciousness?’ in The Nature of Mind. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Audi, R. (1998). Epistemology. London: Routledge.
Augustine, St. (2008). Confessions. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Austin, J. L. (1962). How to do Things with Words. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (1961). ‘Unfair to Facts,’ in Philosophical Papers. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (1950). ‘Truth.’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 24, 111-128.
Ayer, A. J. (1992). The Philosophy of A. J. Ayer, (ed.) L. E. Hahn. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court.
- (1973). The Central Questions of Philosophy. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
- (1972). ‘One’s Knowledge of Other Minds,’ in Philosophical Essays. London: Macmillan & Saint Martin’s Press.
- (1963). ‘Truth.’ In The Concept of Person and Other Essays. London: Macmillan Press.
- (1959). ‘Verification and Experience.’ In (ed.) A. J. Ayer, Logical Positivism. New York: The Free Press.
- (1952). Language, Truth and Logic. New York: Dover Publication.
Baars, B. (1997). In the Theater of Consciousness: The Workspace of the Mind. New York: Oxford University Press.
Backer, G. P. (1974). ‘Criteria: a New Foundations for Semantics.’ Ratio 1656-189.
Baker, G. P. & P. M. S. Hacker (1980). Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning. An Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Beaney, M. (ed.) (1997). The Frege Reader. Oxford: Blackwell.
Bell, D. (1990). Husserl: The Arguments of the Philosophers. London: Routledge.
Berkeley, G. (1975). Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (1713), Philosophical Works Including the Work on Vision, (ed.) M. R. Ayers. London: Everyman.
- (1975). Of the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710), Philosophical Works Including the Work on Vision, (ed.) M. R. Ayers. London: Everyman.
Black, M. (1954). Problems of Analysis. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Blackburn, S. (1984). Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Blanchard, B. (1939). The Nature of Thought, vol. 2. London: George Allen and Unwin.
Block, N. (1995). ‘On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness.’ Behavioural and Brain Sciences 18, 227-47.
- (1987). ‘Functional Role and Truth-Condition.’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 61, 167-181.
Bonjour, L. (2002). Epistemology: Classic Problems and Contemporary Responses. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- (1998). In Defense of Pure Reason. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
- (1985). The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Bosanquet, B. (2015). Truth and Coherence (1911). Reprints from the collection of the University of Michigan Library.
Bradley, F. H. (1914). Essays on Truth and Reality. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Brake, E., J. Millum (2016). ‘Parenthood and Procreation,’ in (ed.) E. N. Zalta, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (internet archive).
Brandon, R. B. (2000). Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Burge, T. (2005). ‘Sinning against Frege,’ in Truths, Thoughts, Reason: Essays on Frege. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- (1979). ‘Individualism and the Mental.’ In Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. IV, Studies in Metaphysics, (eds.) P. A. French, T. E. Uehling Jr., H. K. Wettstein, 73-121.
Campbell, K. (1990). Abstract Particulars. Oxford: Blackwell.
- (1981). ‘The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars.’ Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6, 477-486. Republished in S. Lawrence and C. McDonald (eds.) (1988). Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics. Oxford: Blackwell.
- (1974). ‘One Form of Scepticism about Induction,’ in R. Swinburne, The Justification of Induction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Carnap, R. (1947). ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology,’ in Meaning and Necessity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- (1937). The Logical Syntax of Language. London: Keagan Paul Trench & Trubner.
Chalmers, D. J. (2006). ‘The Foundations of Two-Dimensional Semantics,’ in M. Garcia-Carpintero, J. Macià, Two-Dimensional Semantics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Church, A. (1956), Introduction to Mathematical Logic. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- ‘Review of Language Truth and Logic.’ Journal of Symbolic Logic, 14, 1949.
Cornman, J. W. (1975). Perception, Common Sense and Science. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Copleston, Friedrick (1993). A History of Philosophy. New York: Doubleday.
Costa, C. (2014). Lines of Thought: Rethinking Philosophical Assumptions. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
- (2011). Paisagens conceituais: ensaios filosóficos. Rio de Janeiro: Tempo Brasileiro.
- (2002). The Philosophical Inquiry: Towards a Global Account. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
- (1995). ‘Fatos empíricos,’ in A Linguagem Factual. Rio de Janeiro: Tempo Brasileiro.
- (1990). Wittgensteins Beitrag zu einer sprachphilosophischen Semantik. Konstanz: Hartung-Gorre Verlag.
Crane, T. (1991). ‘All the Difference in the World.’ Philosophical Quarterly 41, 162, 1-26.
Dancy, J. (1985). Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell.
Davidson, D. (1986). ‘True to the Facts.’ The Journal of Philosophy, 66, 748-64.
Dennett, D. (1993). Consciousness Explained. New York: Penguin Books.
Dennett, D. (1982). ‘Beyond Belief,’ in A. Woodfield (ed.), Thought and Object: Essays on Intentionality. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Descartes (1978). Meditationes de pima philosophia – Meditationes Métaphysiques (1641)Paris: J. Vrin.
Devitt, M. & K. Sterelny (1999). Language and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Devitt, M. (1997). Realism and Truth. Oxford: Blackwell.
- (1990). ‘Meanings just ain’t in the Head,’ in George Boolos (ed.), Meanings and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- 1981. Designation. New York: Columbia University Press.
Donnellan, K. (1970). ‘Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions.’ Synthesis 21, 335-58. Republished as ‘Names and Identifying Descriptions,’ in Donald Davidson & Gilbert Harman (1972) (eds.): Semantics of Natural Language, Dordrecht: Reidel.
- (1974). ‘Speaking of Nothing,’ The Philosophical Review, 83, 3-32.
Duhem, P. (1906). La Théorie physique: Son object et sa structure. Paris: Chevalier & Riviére.
Dummett, M. (1993), ‘What is a Theory of Meaning? (I)’ and ‘What is a Theory of Meaning? (II),’ in The Seas of Language. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- (1981a). The Interpretation of Frege’s Philosophy. London: Duckworth.
- (1981b). Frege: Philosophy of Language (1973). London: Duckworth.
- (1978). Truth and Other Enigmas. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Dupré, J. (1993). The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foudations of the Disunity of Science. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- (1981). ‘Natural Kinds and Biological Taxa.’ The Philosophical Review 90, 66-91.
Elburne, P. (2011). Meaning: A Slim Guide to Semantics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Engels, P. (2002). Truth. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Erwin, E., L. Kleiman, E. Zemach (1974). ‘The Historical Theory of Reference.’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 56, 50-56.
Evans, G. (1985). ‘Semantic Theory and Tacit Knowledge,’ in G. Evans, Collected Papers. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (1982). The Varieties of Reference, ed. J. McDowell. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (1973). ‘The Causal Theory of Names,’ Aristotelian Society: Supplementary Volume 47.
Fernandes, M. (1963). ‘A descoberta do vinho’ in Fabulas fabulosas. Rio de Janeiro: J. Álvaro editora.
Fitch, G. W. (2004). Kripke. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Fogelin, R. (1995). Wittgenstein. London: Routledge.
Forbes, G. (1990). ‘The Indispensability of Sinn.’ Philosophical Review 89, 535-63.
Foster, J. (2000). The Nature of Perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Frankfurt, H. (2005). On Bullshit. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Frege, G. (1918-1919a). ‘Die Verneinung.’ Beitrage zur philosophische des deutschen Idealismus 1, 143-157
Frege, G. (1918-1919b). ‘Der Gedanke.’ Beitrage zur philosophie des deutschen Idealismus 2, 58-77.
- (1969). ‘Einleitung in die Logik, in H. Hermes, F. Kambartel, F. Kaulbach (eds.), Nachgelassene Schriften. Hamburg: Felix Meiner.
- (1969). ‘Ausführungen über Sinn und Bedeutung,’ in H. Hermes, F. Kambartel, F. Kaulbach (eds.), Nachgelassene Schriften. Hamburg: Felix Meiner.
- (1892). ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung.’ Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, NF 100, 25-50.
- (1892). ‘Über Begriff und Gegenstand.’ Vierteljahreschrift für wissen­schaftliche Philosophie 16, 192-205.
- (2008). ‘Funktion und Begriff’ (1891), in Günter Patzig (ed.), Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung. Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht.
- (1988). Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884). Hamburg: Felix Meiner.
- Freud, S. (2014). ‘Formulierungen über die zwei Prinzipien des psychischen Geschehens’ (2011), in Werke aus den Jahren 1909-1913. Gesammelte Werke. Frankfurt: Fisher Verlag.
- (1998). Die Traumdeutung (1900). Frankfurt: Fischer Verlag.
Glock, H-J. (2010). Wittgenstein-Lexikon. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
Gower, B. (2006). ‘A. J. Ayer: Language, Truth and Logic’, in J. Shand (ed.) Central Works of Philosophy, vol. 4. Montreal & Kingston: McGill Queen’s University Press.
Grice, P. (1989). Studies in the Ways of Words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Grice, H. P. & P. F. Strawson (1956). ‘In Defense of a Dogma.’ The Philosophical Review 65, 141-158.
Haack, S. (1978). Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Habermas, J. (1984). ‘Wahrheitstheorien,’ in Vorstudien und Ergänzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
- (1976), ‘Was heißt Universal Pragmatik?’ in K. O. Apel (ed.), Sprach­pragmatik und Philosophie. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
Hacker, P. M. S. (1990). Wittgenstein: Meaning and Mind: An Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations, vol. 3, part I. Oxford: Blackwell.
- (1986). Insight and Illusion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hamilton, A. (1988). ‘Mill, Phenomenalism, and the Self,’ in J. Skorupsky (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Mill. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hare, H. H. (1981). Moral Thinking, its Levels, Methods and Point. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Harman, G. (1999). ‘(Non-Solipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics,’ in G. Harman, Reasoning, Meaning and Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hempel, C. G. (1967). Philosophy of Natural Science. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- (1959). ‘The Empiricist Criterion of Meaning,’ in A. J. Ayer (ed.), Logical Positivism. New York: Free Press. First published in the Revue Internationale de Philosophie, vol. 4 (1950).
- (1935). ‘On the Logical Positivists’ Theory of Truth.’ Analysis 2, 49-59.
Hilmy, S. S. (1987). The Later Wittgenstein. Oxford: Blackwell.
Hughes, C. (2004). Kripke: Names, Necessity and Identity. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Huemer, M. (2001). Skepticism and the Veil of Perception. Lanham, MD: Roman & Littlefeld.
Hume, D. (2004) An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748). New York: Barnes & Noble.
- (1975). A Treatise of Human Nature (1738). L.A. Selby-Bigge (ed.), 2a. ed. revised by P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Husserl, E. (1954). Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phenomenologie: eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Husserliana, vol. VI.
- (1976). Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag.  
- (1980). Logischen Untersuchungen (1901), 3 vols. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag.
Hylton, P. (2003). ‘The Theory of Descriptions,’ in N. Griffin (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Johnston, M. (1997). ‘Manifest Kinds.’ The Journal of Philosophy, 94, 564-83.
Kallestrup, J. (2012). Semantic Externalism. London: Routledge.
Kant, E. (1988). Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1787). Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
- 1988. Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können (1783). Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
Kaplan, D. (1989). ‘Demonstratives,’ in J. Almog, J. Perry & H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes from Kaplan. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Katz, J. (1990). ‘Has the Description Theory of Names been Refuted?,’ in G. Boolos (ed.), Meaning and Method: Essays in Honour of Hilary Putnam. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kenny, A. (1995). Frege: An Introduction to the Founder of Modern Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell.
- 1973. Wittgenstein. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Kirkham, R. (1995). Theories of Truth: A Critical Introduction. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Kneale, W. & M. Kneale (1985). The Development of Logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kolakowsky, L. (2001). Metaphysical Horror. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kornblith, H. (1980). ‘Referring to Artifacts.’ Philosophical Review 89, 109-114.
Kripke, S. (2013). Reference and Existence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (1982). Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: An Elementary Exposition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- (1980). Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- (1971). ‘Identity and Necessity,’ in M. K. Munitz (ed.), Identity and Individuation. New York: New York University Press.
Künne, W. (2013). Conceptions of Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Laporte, J. (2004). Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Larson, R., G. Segal (1995). Knowledge of Meaning: An Introduction to Semantic Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Lau J., M. Deutsch (2016). ‘Externalism about Mental Content.’ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (internet archive).
Leibniz (1921). Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humaine (1765). Paris: Flamarion.
Lemos, N. (2004). Common Sense: A Contemporary Defence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lewis, D. K. (1986). On the Plurality of the Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
- (1984). ‘Putnam’s Paradox.’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 62, 221-236.
- (1969). Convention: A Philosophical Study. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Loar, B. (1976). ‘The Semantics of Singular Terms.’ Philosophical Studies, 30, 353-377.
Locke, J. (1975). Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), (ed.) P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Losee, J. (1971). A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Loux, M. L. (2002). Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction. London: Routledge.
Lowe, E. J. (1992). ‘Experience and its Objects,’ in T. Crane (ed.), The Contents of Experience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Luntley, M. (1999). Contemporary Philosophy of Thought: Truth, World, Content. Oxford: Blackwell.
Lycan, W. G. (2006). ‘The Meaning of Water: An Unsolved Problem,’ in E. Sosa & E. Vallanueva (eds.), Philosophy of LanguagePhilosophical Issues, 16, 184-199.
- 2000. Philosophy of Language: A Contemporary Introduction. London: Routledge.
Lynski, L. (1977). Names and Descriptions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Mackie J. L. (1980). The Cement of the Universe: A Study of Causation (1974) Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Maddy, P. (1990). Realism in Mathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Malcolm, N. (1954). ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations,’ The Philosophical Review, 63, 530-559.
Malinowski, B. (1989). ‘The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages,’ published as a supplement in C. K. Ogden & I. A. Richards: The Meaning of Meaning (1923). Orlando: Mariner Books.
Maurin A-S. (2002). If Tropes. Berlin: Springer Verlag.
- (2007). ‘Infinite Regress – Virtue or Vice?’ In Hommage À Vlodeck: 60 Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Vlodeck Rabinowicz (Lund University; internet resource).
Manetti, G. (1990). Theories of the Sign in Classical Antiquity. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
Marcus, R. B. (1993). Modalities: Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McDowell, J. (1998). ‘On the Sense and Reference of a Proper Name,’ in Meaning, Knowledge and Reality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- (1992). ‘Putnam on Mind and Meaning,’ Philosophical Topics 20, 1, 1992, 35-48.
McGinn, C. (2000). Logical Properties: Identity, Existence, Predication, Necessity, Truth. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- (1976) ‘On the Necessity of Origin’. Journal of Philosophy, 73.
Mellor, D. H. (1977). ‘Natural Kinds.’ British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 28, 299-312.
Mill, J. S. (2002). System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive (1891)Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific.
- (1979). An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy and of the Principal Philosophical Questions Discussed in his Writings (1889), in J. M. Robson (ed.), The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill IX. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Miller, A. (2007). Philosophy of Language. London: Routledge.
Misak, C. H. (2013). The American Pragmatics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (1995). Verificationism: History and Prospects. London and New York: Routledge.
Moore, G. E. (1959). ‘A Defence of Common Sense,’ in Philosophical Papers. London: George Allen & Unwin.
- ‘The Meaning of Real’ (1953), in Some Main Problems of Philosophy. London: George Allen & Unwin.
Morris, C. W. (1938). Foundations of the Theory of Signs. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Mosteller, T. M. (2014). Theories of Truth: An Introduction. London: Bloomsbury.
Mulligan, K., P. Simons, B. Smith (2006). ‘What is Wrong with Contemporary Philosophy?’ Topoi 25, 63-67.
Mulligan, K., P. Simons, B. Smith (1984). ‘Truth-Makers.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 44, 297-321.
Nozick, R. (1983). Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
Neale, S. (1990). Descriptions. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Neurath, O. (1931). ‘Soziologie im Physicalismus,’ in his Gesammelte philosophische und methodologische Schriften. Vienna: Holder-Pischler Tempsky.
Nietzsche, F. (1977). The Portable Nietzsche, ed. & transl. by W. Kaufmann. New York: Penguin Books.
Nishimoto, S. et all (2011). ‘Reconstructing Visual Experiences from Brain Activity Evoked by Natural Movies.’ Current Biology, 21.
Ostertag, G. (ed.) (1998). Definite Descriptions: A Reader. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Papineau, D. (2012). Philosophical Devices: Proofs, Probabilities, Possibilities and Sets. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Patzig, G. (1980). ‘Satz und Tatsache,’ in Tatsachen, Normen, Sätze: Aufsätze und Vorträge. Stuttgart: Reclam.
- (1977) ‘Husserl on Truth and Evidence,’ in J. N. Mohanty (ed.), Readings on E. Husserl’s Logical Investigations. Den Haag: Nijhoff.
Pears, D. (1970). Wittgenstein. London: Penguin Books.
Peirce, C. S. (2005). The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings (1867-1896), vol. I. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
- (1931). Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 8 vols. Vols. 1-6 eds. C. Hartshorne & P. Weiss. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (1931-1935). Vols. 7-8 ed. A. Burks. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (1958).
- (1905). ‘Issues of Pragmaticism,’ The Monist, 15, 4, 481-499.
Perry, J. (1979). ‘The Problem of the Essential Indexical.’ Nous, 13, 3-20.
- (1977). ‘Frege on Demonstratives.’ Philosophical Review 86, 474-97.
Pessin, A., S. Goldberg (eds.) (1996). The Twin Earth Chronicles: Twenty Years of Reflexion on Hilary Putnam’s ‘The Meaning of ‘“Meaning”’. New York: M. E. Sharpe.
Plato (1996). ‘Parmenides.’ The Collected Dialogues of Plato. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
Polger, T. W. (2004). Natural Minds. Cambridge MS: MIT-Press.
Popper, K. (1972). Objective Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (1969). Conjectures and Refutations. London: Routledge.
- (1959). The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London: Hutchinson. First published as Logik der Forschung (1935). Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
Price, H. H. (1953). Thinking and Experience. Oxford: Hutchinson University Press.
Putnam, H. (1989). Representation and Reality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- (1981). Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- (1975). ‘The Meaning of “Meaning”,’ in Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, volume 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Quine, W. V. (1980). ‘Two Dogmas of the Empiricism,’ in From a Logical Point of View. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Word and Object (1960). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- (1948/9). ‘On What There Is.’ Review of Metaphysics, 21-38.
Rasmussen, J. (2014). Defending the Correspondence Theory of Truth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Recanati, F. (2012). Mental Files. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (2008). Philosophie du langage (et de l’esprit). Paris: Gallimard.
Reichembach H. (1953). ‘The Verifiability Theory of Meaning.’ In Readings in the Philosophy of Science, ed. H. Feigl & M. Brodbeck. New York: Appleton-Century-Croftz.
- (1938). Experience and Prediction. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Rescher, N. (1973). The Coherence Theory of Truth. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Rosenthal, D. M. (2005). Consciousness and Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Reid, T. (1967). An Inquiry into the Human Mind and the Principles of Common Sense, in Philosophical Works. Hildeseheim, BRD: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, vol. 1.
Rosh, E. (1999). ‘Principles of Categorization,’ in E. Margolis & S. Laurence (eds.), Concepts: Core Readings. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Runggaldier, E. (1985). Zeichen und Bezeichnetes: Sprachphilosophische Unter­suchungen zum Problem der Referenz. Berlin: Walter der Gruyter.
Russell, B. (1966). An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth. London: Allen & Unwin.
- (1957) ‘Mr. Strawson on Referring.’ Mind, New Series, 66, 385-389.
- (2009). ABC of Relativity (1925). London: Routledge.
- (1929). Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy (1919)London: George Allen & Unwin.
- (1994). ‘The Philosophy of Logical Atomism’ (1918), rep. in Logic and Knowledge: Essays 1901-1950 (1956), (ed.) R. C. Marsch. London: Routledge.
- (1910). ‘Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description.’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 11, 108-128.
- (1980). The Problems of Philosophy (1912). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (1905). ‘On Denoting.’ Mind, New Series, 14, 479-493.
Ryle, G. (1957). ‘The Theory of Meaning.’ In British Philosophy in the Mid-Century, ed. C. A. Mace. London: George Allen & Unwin.
- (1990). The Concept of Mind (1949). London: Penguin Books.
Sainsbury, R. M. (2009). Paradoxes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sainsbury, M. (1979). Russell. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Salmon, M. (2002). Introduction to Logic and Critical Thinking. Wadsworth.
Salmon, W. C. (1966). The Foundations of Scientific Inference. Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press.
Salmon, N. U. (2005). Reference and Essence (1980). New York: Prometheus Books.
Schlick, M. (1938). Gesammelte Aufsätze 1926-1936. Vienna: Gerold & Co.
- (1936). ‘Meaning and Verification.’ Philosophical Review, vol. 45, 339-368.
- (1910). ‘Das Wesen der Wahrheit nach der modernen Logik.’ Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie and Soziologie 30, 386-477.
Schwarz, S. (2002). ‘General Terms, and Rigidity: A Reply to LaPorte.’ Philosophical Studies 109, 265-277.
- (1978). ‘Putnam on Artifacts.’ Philosophical Review 87, 566-74.
Searle, J. R. (2015). Seeing Things as they Are. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (2008). ‘The Unity of the Proposition,’ in Searle, Philosophy in a New Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- (2004). Mind: A Brief Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (1999). Mind, Language and Society: Doing Philosophy in the Real World. London: Weinfeld & Nicholson.
- (1998). ‘Truth: A Reconsideration of Strawson’s View,’ in L. E. Hahn (ed.): The Philosophy of P. F. Strawson. Chicago: Open Court.
- (1983). Intentionality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- (1969). Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- (1967). ‘Proper Names and Descriptions,’ in Paul Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Macmillan Publishers, vol. 6.
- (1958). ‘Proper Names.’ Mind 67,166-173.
Sellars, W. (1962). ‘Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man,’ in Frontiers of Science and Philosophy, Robert Colodny (ed.) (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press): 35-78.
Shields, C. (2007). Aristotle. London: Routledge.
Sidelle, A. (1989). Necessity, Essence, and Individuation: A Defence of Conventionalism. Cornell: Cornell University Press.
Simons, P. (1995), ‘Meaning and Language,’ in B. Smith & D. W. Smith, The Cambridge Companion to Husserl. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- (1994). ‘Particulars in Particular Clothings: Three Trope Theories of Substance.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54, 553-75.
Smith, A. D. (2005). ‘Natural Kind Terms: A Neo-Lockean Theory.’ European Journal of Philosophy, 13, 70-88.
Soames, S. (2003). Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, vol. 2.
Sokolowski, R. (2000). Introduction to Phenomenology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- (1974). Russellian Meditations. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
Stalnaker, R. (1978). ‘Assertion,’ in P. Cole (ed.), PragmaticsNew York: New York Academic Press, vol. 9, 315-32.
Stegmüller, W. (1989). Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartigen Philosophie, Band 1. Stuttgart: Kröner Verlag.
Stenius, E. G. (1981). ‘The Picture Theory and Wittgenstein’s Later Attitude to it,’ in I. Block (ed.), Perspectives in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (1960). Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: A Critical Exposition of its Main Lines of Thought. Oxford: Blackwell.
Sterelny, K. (1983). ‘On Natural Kind Terms.’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 44, 110-25.
Strawson, P. F. (1991). ‘Reply to Searle,’ in L. E. Hahn (ed.): The Philosophy of Strawson. Chicago: Open Court.
- (1987). Scepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties. London: Routledge.
- (1971). ‘The asymmetry of subject and predicates,’ in Logic-Linguistic Papers. London: Methuen.
(1991). Individuals: An Essay on Descriptive Metaphysics (1959). London: Routledge.
- (1952). Introduction to Logical Theory. London: Methuen.
- (1950). ‘Truth.’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary vol. XXIV, 1-23.
- (1950). ‘On Referring.’ Mind 59, 320-344.
Stroll, A. (2009). Informal Philosophy. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- (1996). Sketches and Landscapes. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Stroud, B. (1984). The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Swinburne R. G. (1975). ‘Analyticity, Necessity and Apriority.’ Mind 84, 225-243.
Tarsky, A. (1944). ‘The Semantic Conception of Truth.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 4, 341-375.
Teeple R. C., Caplan J. P., Stem T. A. (2009). ‘Visual Hallucinations: Differential Diagnosis and Treatment.’ Primary Care Companion to the Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, 11 (1), 2009, 26-32.
Textor, M. (2011). Frege on Sense and Reference. New York: Routledge.
Tononi, G. (2011). ‘An Information Integration Theory of Consciousness,’ BMC Neuroscience, 5-42
Tugendhat, E. (1992a). ‘Überlegungen zur Methode der Philosophie aus analytischen Sicht,’ in Philosophische Aufsätze. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
- (1992b). ‘Die Bedeutung des Ausdrucks “Bedeutung” bei Frege,’ in Philosophische Aufsätze. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
- (1976). Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die sprachanalytische Philosophie. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. English translation: Traditional and Analytical Phiosophy: Lectures on the Philosophy of Laguage (Cambridge Philosophy Classics) (2016). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- (1970). Die Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger. Berlin: Walter de Gruyer.
Tugendhat, E. & U. Wolf (1983). Logische-Semantik Propädeutik. Stuttgart: Reclam.
Urmson, J. G. (1983). Berkeley. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Urmson, J. O. (1956). Philosophical Analysis: Its Development between the Two Wars. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Vallicella, W. F. (2002). ‘Relations, Monism and the Vindication of Bradley’s Regress,’ Dialectica, 56, 3-35.
Velmans, M. & S. Schneider (2007). The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Vision, G. 2004. Veritas: The Correspondence Theory and its Critics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Waismann, F. (1986). Logik, Sprache, Philosophie. Stuttgart: Reclam.
Walker, R. C. S. (1988). The Coherence Theory of Truth: Realism, Anti-Realism, Idealism. London: Routledge.
Weber, M. (2010). Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus (1905). Munich: Beck Verlag.
Wettstein, H. (2004). The Magic Prism: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wiggins, D. (2001). Sameness and Substance Renewed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- (1995). ‘The Kant-Frege-Russell View of Existence: Toward the Rehabilitation of the Second Level View,’ in W. Sinnot-Armstrong, D. Raffman, N. Asher (eds.), Modality, Morality and Belief. Essays in Honor of Ruth Barcan Marcus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Williams, D. C. (1953). ‘The Elements of Being.’ Review of Metaphysics, vol. 7 (2), 3-18, 171-192.
- (1942). The Ground of Induction. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Wisdom, J. (1969). Philosophy and Psychoanalysis. New York: Barnes & Noble.
Wittgenstein, L. (1984a). Über Gewissheit, Werkausgabe Band 8. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
- (1984b). ZettelWerkausgabe Band 8. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
- (1984c). Philosophische Untersuchungen, Werkausgabe Band 1. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
- (1975). The Blue and the Brown Books. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (1984d). Philosophische Grammatik, Werkausgabe Band 4. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
- (2001). Wittgenstein’s Lectures: Cambridge 1932-1935, (ed.) Alice Ambrose. New York: Prometheus Books.
- (1980). Wittgenstein’s Lectures: Cambridge 1930-1932, (ed.) D. Lee. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (1984e). Philosophische Bemerkungen, Werkausgabe Band 2. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
- (1984f). Ludwig Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis, Werkausgabe Band 3. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
- (1984g). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Werkausgabe Band 1. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
Wrenn, C. (2015). Truth. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Zemach, E. (1986). ‘Putnam’s Theory on the Reference of the Substance Terms.’ Journal of Philosophy 73, 116-27
Ziff, P. (1960). Semantic Analysis. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Ziman, J. M. (1968). Public Knowledge: An Essay Concerning the Social Dimension of Science. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Zink, P. (1963). ‘The Meaning of Proper Names.’ Mind 72, 481-489.